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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge 
 
Cecil Hankins, an African-American and a long-time 
employee of the City of Philadelphia ("the City"), brought 
this action against the City under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Action of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, and 42 U.S.C. S 1985. Hankins also sued his union, 
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, District Council 47, Local 2187 ("Local 2187" or 
the "Union"), under 42 U.S.C. S 1985 and state law.1 
Hankins's primary allegations are that the City denied him 
a promotion to become the Director of its AIDS Activities 
Coordinating Office ("AACO Director" or"Program Director") 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hankins originally sued both Local 2187 and it parent union, 
AFSCME. He has since abandoned his claims against AFSCME, however, 
and therefore all references in this opinion to the Union will refer only 
to 
Local 2187. 
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because of his race, and that Local 2187 conspired with the 
City to deny him the position for the same illegitimate 
reason. The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of both defendants. The District Court also denied 
plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the City based on 
three instances of alleged misconduct by the City's counsel 
during the course of discovery. 
 
We conclude that the District Court improperly resolved 
certain factual disputes that are central to Hankins's race 
discrimination claims against the City, and will therefore 
reverse the grant of summary judgment in the City's favor. 
We will affirm the District Court in all other respects. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
As this appeal arises from the grant of defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, we recount the facts 
contained in the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, 
the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
 
A. The AIDS Activities Coordinating Office  
 
The AIDS Activities Coordination Office ("AACO") was 
founded in 1987 as part of the City's Department of Health. 
Among its responsibilities, AACO oversees AIDS prevention 
programs and the distribution of government funding for 
AIDS-related services in Philadelphia. According to David 
Fair, AACO's first director, the office was founded at a time 
of increasing tensions between AIDS advocacy groups 
identified with the "white, gay community" and other 
individuals and organizations representing ethnic and 
racial minorities afflicted with HIV and AIDS. 2 Although the 
conflict between the two sides had different dimensions, the 
core dispute concerned the allegation that a 
disproportionate percentage of the funds available for AIDS- 
related services were allocated to organizations affiliated 
with the white, gay community, despite the fact that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We use the phrase "white, gay community" because the record reflects 
its usage among the parties and the witnesses in this case, not because 
we necessarily share the view that there is an identifiable "community" 
made up exclusively of individuals who are white and gay. 
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disease was having an increasingly devastating effect on 
minorities. 
 
This competition for funding fostered a politically and 
racially charged atmosphere surrounding the AACO and its 
Director. Dr. Robert Ross, the City's Health Commissioner 
during most of the events relevant to this lawsuit and the 
individual responsible for appointing the Program Director, 
was aware of these circumstances. According to Fair, he 
and Dr. Ross had several conversations concerning the 
growing impact that AIDS was having on minority 
communities. In the course of these discussions, Dr. Ross, 
who is an African-American, often acknowledged the strong 
influence that the leaders of the white, gay community had 
in Philadelphia political circles, including the Mayor's office. 
 
The City had difficulty attracting and retaining qualified 
individuals to the AACO Directorship because, among other 
reasons, decisions regarding AIDS funding were widely 
perceived as having racial and ethnic undertones, AACO 
was an under-funded office and subject to intense media 
criticism, and there were salary constraints on the position 
occasioned by the City's fiscal crisis. Faced with a vacancy 
in the position in the Summer of 1992, Dr. Ross asked 
Anola Vance, an African-American woman who was then 
the manager of the AIDS Education and Counseling 
Services Division of AACO, if she would consider becoming 
the next Program Director. Although Vance had previously 
declined the position on several occasions, this time she 
reluctantly accepted. After submitting a civil service 
application that was approved by the City's personnel 
office, Vance was formally appointed AIDS Program Director 
in July 1992. Vance did not last very long, however, and 
within a few months she informed Dr. Ross, as well as 
Barry Savitz, the Deputy Health Commissioner, that she 
did not wish to remain in the job. While Vance agreed to 
remain Program Director until a suitable replacement was 
found, Dr. Ross and Savitz began to consider other 
candidates for the position. 
 
B. Plaintiff's Employment History with the City 
 
Cecil Hankins began working for the City in 1978 at the 
Department of Human Services, and subsequently held 
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various positions within the Health Department before 
joining AACO in 1987 as a program analyst. Approximately 
six months after arriving at AACO, Hankins was promoted 
to program analyst supervisor. Less than one year later, 
Hankins was asked to serve as Acting Director of AIDS 
Agency Services, a senior supervisory position within AACO 
that reported directly to the Program Director. Hankins 
held this position intermittently until March 1992, but 
ultimately did not receive a permanent appointment to the 
post because he did not attain a sufficiently high score on 
the civil service examination for the position. At Dr. Ross's 
direction, Hankins was eventually transferred from AACO to 
work at the Charles R. Drew Mental Health Center (the 
"Drew Center"), a private facility which the City had 
recently assumed operational control over. By early July 
1992, Hankins was again transferred by Dr. Ross; this time 
to work in the Health Commissioner's office on a project 
related to urban violence. 
 
Later that same month, Hankins informed Dr. Ross and 
Deputy Health Commissioner Estelle Richman that he 
intended to resign from the City. Both Dr. Ross and 
Richman attempted to discourage him from resigning, but 
Hankins would not reconsider. In his resignation letter to 
Dr. Ross, Hankins noted that he was leaving the City with 
"tremendous ambivalence," but did so to meet"unforseen 
challenges." Following his departure from City employment, 
Hankins eventually became privately employed at the Drew 
Center, where he remained until December 1993. 
 
C. The Program Director Appointments 
 
One of the individuals whom Dr. Ross and Barry Savitz 
considered to replace Anola Vance as AACO Director was 
Richard Scott, a former Health Department employee who 
had been on a leave of absence from the City for eight 
years. During that time, Scott was serving as the elected 
union agent for Local 2187, which is the certified collective 
bargaining representative for certain classes of City 
employees, including many employees in the Health 
Department. As a union agent, Scott's duties included 
representing the Union's membership in arbitration and 
grievance proceedings, as well as representing the Union at 
meetings of the Civil Service Commission. Dr. Ross and 
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Savitz had frequent dealings with Scott in his role as union 
agent and were both impressed by the manner that Scott 
did his job. Dr. Ross and Savitz also knew Scott as a 
prominent, long-time activist in the Philadelphia AIDS 
community. Among his other experience, Scott had served 
as the chairperson of the AIDS Advocacy Coalition, an 
organization formed during the early years of the AIDS 
crisis to press for greater funding for AIDS-related services. 
According to David Fair, Scott was widely viewed, including 
by Dr. Ross and Savitz, as an influential leader in the gay, 
white community and as someone who represented an 
important political constituency in the City. 
 
At the suggestion of Savitz, Dr. Ross asked Richard Scott 
in the Fall of 1992 whether he would consider leaving his 
job as union agent for Local 2187 to become the next 
Program Director. At the time, Scott told Dr. Ross that 
family responsibilities prevented him from accepting the 
position. In January 1993, Dr. Ross again asked Scott if he 
would be interested in the AACO Directorship. This time 
Scott agreed to be considered. During their subsequent 
discussions about the position, Scott expressed concern to 
Dr. Ross that, under the existing civil service specifications, 
he did not have the requisite qualifications for the position. 
At the time, the civil service specifications required that the 
Program Director have, among other qualifications, 
permanent civil service status, a master's degree, and three 
years of so-called second-level supervisory experience 
directing an AIDS/HIV-related program providing services 
for a large government jurisdiction.3 Although Scott did 
have permanent civil service status by virtue of his previous 
employment by the City, he did not have either of the other 
credentials. Despite this, Dr. Ross told Scott that he would 
attempt to have "the job made available to [Scott]," which 
Scott interpreted to mean that Dr. Ross would have the civil 
service specifications changed to match his qualifications. 
 
In late January 1993, Scott informed Dr. Ross that he 
would accept the Program Director position. Scott 
terminated his employment with Local 2187 on February 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "Second-level supervisory experience" refers to directing a program 
through subordinate supervisors. 
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15, 1993 and resumed active employment with the City the 
following day. Although Scott was given the title of Acting 
Program Director and an official civil service announcement 
had not yet been released, both Dr. Ross and Scott 
regarded the appointment as permanent. 
 
At Dr. Ross's request, Barry Savitz worked with Joseph 
McNally, the Health Department's Personnel Officer, to 
"broaden" the eligibility criteria for the Program Director 
position for the specific purpose of allowing Richard Scott 
to qualify for the position. As a result of Savitz and 
McNally's efforts, new civil service specifications for the 
Program Director position were promulgated in January 
1993. Under these new specifications, permanent civil 
service status was still required, but a candidate could now 
substitute a bachelor's degree and three years of experience 
administering a "national HIV/AIDS program" in place of 
three years of second-level supervisory experience and a 
master's degree. The new specifications also provided that 
a candidate could be eligible for the position if he or she 
had "[a]ny equivalent combination of education and 
experience determined to be acceptable by the Personnel 
Department," and further provided that volunteer 
experience could substitute for paid employment 
experience. As a result of these changes, Richard Scott, 
who held a bachelor's degree and had managed a nation- 
wide HIV/Prevention program on a volunteer basis for more 
than three years, was eligible to become Program Director. 
The amended specifications were approved by the Civil 
Service Commission at its January 1993 meeting. 
 
At some point during the same month, Hankins, who was 
no longer employed by the City, learned that Anola Vance 
was leaving her job as Program Director. According to 
Hankins, he telephoned Dr. Ross to express his interest in 
the position. Their subsequent conversation is, in many 
respects, the heart of this lawsuit. According to Hankins, 
when he informed Dr. Ross that he would like to be 
considered for the Program Director position, Dr. Ross told 
him that the job was "reserved for the gay, white 
community." App. at 489. When Hankins questioned Dr. 
Ross about the fairness of making such a decision on the 
basis of race, Dr. Ross reiterated his position and further 
 
                                7 
  
stated that Richard Scott was the specific individual for 
whom the job was reserved. Id. For his part, Dr. Ross 
denies ever telling Hankins or anyone else that the position 
was reserved for someone who was white or gay, and claims 
that Hankins never expressed an interest in becoming 
Program Director. 
 
It is undisputed, however, that Dr. Ross eventually 
arranged for Hankins to return to City employment on 
March 1, 1993, as a program analyst within the Health 
Department's Mental Health/Mental Retardation Unit. As a 
reinstated City employee, Philadelphia civil service 
regulations required that Hankins serve a six month 
probationary period before resuming permanent civil service 
status. 
 
A civil service announcement for the Program Director 
position, reflecting the January 1993 amendments to the 
civil service specifications, was released in June 1993.4 By 
this time, Scott had already been Acting Program Director 
for approximately four months. Despite the fact that 
Hankins had been told by Dr. Ross that the position was 
reserved for a member of the gay, white community, 
Hankins still submitted an application for the job. Richard 
Scott and another white City employee were the only other 
applicants for the position. 
 
Mark O'Connor was the analyst in the City's Personnel 
Department assigned to review all applications for the 
Program Director position. As an employee of the Personnel 
Department, O'Connor did not report to Dr. Ross or anyone 
else from the Health Department. O'Connor's job was to 
evaluate the applications for the Program Director position 
and confirm whether the candidates possessed the requisite 
qualifications for the position. Upon reviewing Hankins's 
application, O'Connor determined that Hankins did not 
have the second-level supervisory experience required 
under the civil service specifications. Accordingly, by letter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. A civil service announcement for the Program Director position was 
first released in May 1993, but that announcement erroneously did not 
reflect the amendments to the job specifications that had been approved 
by the Civil Service Commission in January. 
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dated July 9, 1993, O'Connor notified plaintiff that his 
application had been rejected for that reason. 
 
On July 19, 1993, Hankins submitted an amended 
application for the Program Director position which 
included additional information regarding his qualifications. 
That same day, however, Richard Scott was officially 
appointed AIDS Program Director. Approximately three 
months later, O'Connor notified plaintiff that his amended 
application for Program Director had been rejected because, 
notwithstanding the additional information that Hankins 
had provided concerning his qualifications, O'Connor still 
believed that Hankins did not have the experience required 
for the position. 
 
On October 1, 1994, Richard Scott was removed from his 
position as Program Director and was reassigned to become 
Chief of Staff to Estelle Richman, who had previously 
succeeded Dr. Ross as the City's Health Commissioner. 
Following Scott's departure from AACO, the Program 
Director position remained open for nine months. During 
this period, Hankins again expressed his interest in the 
position to Richman. In July 1995, Richman selected Jesse 
Milan, an African-American who was then working for 
Temple University, to be the next Program Director. 
Because Milan was not a civil service employee, he was 
"loaned" to the City by Temple University outside of the civil 
service process. Milan served as Program Director until his 
resignation in 1997, at which time Richman appointed 
Patricia Bass and Joseph Croneaur interim co-directors of 
AACO. Like Milan, Bass and Croneaur were not City 
employees and were not appointed though the civil service 
process. 
 
D. The Union's Involvement 
 
In his capacity as union agent, Richard Scott was present 
at the January 1993 meeting of the Civil Service 
Commission when the Commission approved the changes 
to the specifications for the Program Director position. As a 
union agent, Scott was responsible for representing Local 
2187 at such meetings on issues related to bargaining unit 
positions. Under the collective bargaining agreement 
between the City and Local 2187, however, the Program 
Director position was not a bargaining unit position. 
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At a general meeting of Local 2187 on June 22, 1993, a 
union shop steward raised the issue of whether there had 
been any impropriety in the Civil Service Commission's 
decision to amend the specifications for the Program 
Director position. Cathy Scott, the union agent who had 
succeeded Richard Scott (but is not related to him), agreed 
to look into the matter. Approximately two months later, 
Ms. Scott submitted a brief report to Local 2187's Executive 
Board in which she detailed the basic facts surrounding 
Richard Scott's appointment as Program Director. Ms. Scott 
did not draw any conclusions about whether there had 
been any impropriety concerning Richard Scott's 
appointment, but did request that the Executive Board 
advise her if it wished her to investigate further. The 
Executive Board did not instruct Ms. Scott to take any 
additional action. 
 
In late September 1993, Hankins wrote a letter to the 
City's Personnel Department challenging the amendment to 
the civil service specifications which allowed an applicant 
for Program Director to substitute volunteer experience in 
place of paid experience. After receiving the City's response 
rejecting his challenge in November 1993, Hankins 
contacted Patricia Walton, the Union's Vice-President, for 
assistance as to how he should proceed in challenging 
Richard Scott's appointment. Walton advised plaintiff that 
she would look into the matter. Walton subsequently 
contacted Hankins sometime in January 1994 and advised 
him that it was too late for the Union to do anything 
regarding the appointment. 
 
II. Procedural History 
 
After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, 
Hankins filed the instant lawsuit in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Hankins's central 
claim is that the City rejected his application to become the 
AIDS Program Director on the basis of his race, in violation 
of Title VII, the PHRA, and 42 U.S.C. S 1983. He also claims 
that the City illegally retaliated against him forfiling this 
lawsuit by refusing to fill the Program Director position 
though the civil service process. Hankins further alleges 
that the City and the Union have conspired to deny him the 
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Program Director position because of his race, in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) and state law. Finally, Hankins 
claims that the Union is liable for tortious interference with 
prospective contractual relations and fraud based on the 
Union's alleged inaction in assisting his challenge to the 
appointment of Richard Scott. 
 
During the course of discovery, plaintiff moved for 
sanctions against the City based on three incidents of 
alleged misconduct on the part of the City's counsel. On the 
first occasion, plaintiff alleges that the City's counsel 
inappropriately communicated with Dr. Ross during a 
break at his deposition to coax him to change a response 
that was unfavorable to the City. In the second incident, 
plaintiff contends that the City's counsel threatened to 
retaliate against David Fair if he did not agree to cooperate 
with the City's investigation of plaintiff's complaint. Lastly, 
plaintiff asserts that the City's counsel and its agents, while 
investigating Hankins's background in his home state of 
South Carolina, contacted his family members under false 
pretenses and circulated damaging misinformation about 
him. The District Court denied Hankins's motion for 
sanctions against the City in full, determining that in all 
three instances cited by plaintiff, the City's counsel had not 
engaged in any misconduct. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
both defendants. Analyzing the case under the McDonnell 
Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting formula, the District Court 
concluded that Hankins could not establish a prima facie 
case of race discrimination against the City because he did 
not have the requisite qualifications to become the AIDS 
Program Director. Hankins v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ. 
A. 95-1449, 1998 WL 175600 at *11-13 (E.D. Pa. April 9, 
1998). Specifically, the District Court held that Hankins did 
not qualify because: (i) he did not have sufficient 
supervisory experience under either the original civil service 
specifications or the specifications as amended in January 
1993; and (ii) at the time the position was filled, Hankins 
was a probationary City employee without permanent civil 
service status, which the District Court believed rendered 
him ineligible to become Program Director under the City's 
civil service regulations. Id. The District Court also 
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dismissed Hankins's retaliation claim against the City 
because plaintiff presented no evidence that the City's 
decision to hire Program Directors outside of the civil 
service process had any connection to the filing of the 
instant lawsuit. Id. 
 
In reaching its conclusion that plaintiff's discrimination 
claims were not viable, the District Court found that Dr. 
Ross's alleged statement that the Program Director position 
was reserved for the gay, white community did not entitle 
plaintiff to a jury trial. According to the District Court, the 
statement was "essentially factual rather than 
discriminatory" because at the time Dr. Ross made the 
comment, he had already concluded that Richard Scott 
"was the best available person for the position[and] Mr. 
Scott was a gay white man." Id. at *13. The District Court 
further observed that, for a variety of reasons, it was 
"virtually inconceivable" that Dr. Ross would have 
intentionally discriminated against Hankins on the basis of 
race. Id. 
 
With respect to Hankins's S 1985(3) and civil conspiracy 
claims against the City and the Union, the District Court 
held that they could not survive summary judgment 
because, among other reasons, there was no evidence that 
any Union official entered into an agreement with the City 
to deny Hankins an employment opportunity based on his 
race. Id. at *14. The Court likewise rejected Hankins's 
tortious interference with prospective business relations 
claim against the Union because Hankins could not prove 
that there was a reasonable probability that he would have 
been selected for the Program Director position if not for 
the allegedly wrongful conduct of the Union. Id. at *15. 
Finally, the District Court dismissed plaintiff's fraud claim 
against the Union because plaintiff "failed to produce 
evidence to sustain a finding of detrimental reliance on or 
actual damages caused by any statement or omission of the 
union, fraudulent or otherwise." Id. Hankins appeals. 
 
III. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1367. We have appellate 
 
                                12 
  
jurisdiction from the final order of the District Court under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary 
judgment, using the same standards that the District Court 
should have applied. Summary judgment should be granted 
where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" 
and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Marzano v. Computer 
Science Corp. Inc., 91 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 1996). In 
making its determination, the court should view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw 
all inferences in that party's favor. Id. We have previously 
observed that this standard is applied with " `added rigor in 
employment discrimination cases, where intent and 
credibility are crucial issues.' " Steward v. Rutgers, the State 
University, 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Robinson v. PPG Indus. Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1162 (7th 
Cir.1994)). 
 
With respect to the District Court's denial of plaintiff's 
motion for sanctions, our standard of review is significantly 
more deferential. We will reverse only if the decision 
constituted an abuse its discretion, which in this context 
would occur if the court "based its ruling on an erroneous 
view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the 
evidence." Rogal v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 
74 F.3d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
IV. Claims Against the City 
 
A. Race Discrimination Claims 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e et seq., provides that "[i]t shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer -- to fail or 
refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such 
individual's race." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1). In the 
employment discrimination context, this provision is 
generally interpreted consistently with the analogous 
section of the PHRA, see Gomez v. Allegheny Health 
Services, Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (3d Cir. 1995), and 
with 42 U.S.C. S 1983, see McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 
32 F.3d 820, 826 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994); cf. St. Mary's Honor 
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Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 606 n.1 (1993) ("we shall 
assume that the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully 
applicable to racial-discrimination-in-employment claims 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983"). Accordingly, our analysis will be 
the same under all three statutes. 
 
A plaintiff can establish a discriminatory intent on the 
part of her employer by direct or indirect means. See 
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 972 (7th Cir. 1997). 
If, as is typically the case, the plaintiff's evidence is entirely 
of an indirect nature, then in order to prevail she must 
satisfy the familiar burden-shifting pretext framework of 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) 
and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 253-54 (1981). The mechanics of this approach have 
been throughly discussed in many of our recent cases and 
we need not recite it in full detail here. It suffices to say 
that the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the substance of which will 
vary depending on the type of claim; if the plaintiff is 
successful, the employer must then articulate a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
decision; once the employer does so, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving both that the employer's proffered 
explanation was false, "and that discrimination was the real 
reason." St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 512; see also 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
In those relatively infrequent instances where a plaintiff 
has direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the case is 
appropriately analyzed under the "mixed motives" analysis 
established by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989), as modified by S 107 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(m) (the 
"1991 Act").5 Under the modified Price Waterhouse 
standard, a defendant is liable for discrimination upon 
proof that a forbidden criterion (e.g., race) "was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We have held that S 107 of the 1991 Act does not apply retroactively. 
See Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, 
however, the allegedly discriminatory action occurred in 1993 and after, 
placing the case within the purview of S 107. 
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other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-2(m). Where an employer proves that it would have 
taken the same adverse action against a plaintiff even if it 
did not consider the forbidden factor, the plaintiff will be 
precluded from seeking damages or reinstatement, but may 
still be entitled to declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, 
as well as attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C.S 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); 
see also Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 932 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (noting that under the 1991 Act, an employer no 
longer has complete defense to liability, as it did under 
Price Waterhouse, by showing that it would have made the 
same adverse employment decision in the absence of a 
discriminatory motive); Armbruster v. Unysis Corp., 32 F.3d 
768, 779 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (same). 
 
Hankins first contends that the District Court erred by 
analyzing his discrimination claims against the City solely 
under a McDonnell Douglas-Burdine pretext analysis. He 
argues that Dr. Ross's comment that the Program Director 
position was "reserved for the gay, white community" is 
sufficiently direct evidence of a discriminatory intent to 
bring his case within the realm of Price Waterhouse.6 
Hankins further asserts that the District Court's 
characterization of Dr. Ross's statement as "essentially 
factual rather than discriminatory," and the Court's 
conclusion that it is "virtually inconceivable" that Dr. Ross 
would discriminate against him are irreconcilable with a 
court's duty on summary judgment to interpret the record 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
 
We have consistently held that a plaintiff who contends 
that he or she has direct evidence of discrimination to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The record is not entirely clear to what extent Hankins pressed his 
Price Waterhouse theory to the District Court. Waiver is not an issue 
here, however, because an employment discrimination plaintiff is not 
required to elect a pretext or Price Waterhouse  theory at trial. 
Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 781 n.17. Instead, the District Court "must 
decide whether one or both theories properly apply at some point in the 
proceedings prior to instructing the jury." Id. (citing Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 247 n.12.). Likewise, before granting summary judgment and 
removing a case from the hands of a jury, the District Court ought to 
consider whether a plaintiff's claim would survive under either a pretext 
or Price Waterhouse theory. 
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warrant treatment under Price Waterhouse faces a heavy 
burden. See, e.g., Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 
506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) ("a plaintiff must clear a high 
hurdle to qualify for a mixed motives instruction"). Stray 
remarks in the workplace, statements by non- 
decisionmakers, or even statements by decisionmakers 
unrelated to the decisional process itself, will not suffice to 
trigger a Price Waterhouse analysis. See Starceski v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). Instead, the plaintiff must be 
able to point to " `conduct or statements by persons 
involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed 
as directly reflecting a discriminatory attitude." Starceski, 
54 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Miller v. CIGNA Corp ., 47 F.3d 586 
(3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)); see also Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 
778. 
 
Although this standard is a stringent one, we agree with 
Hankins that Dr. Ross's statement, if made, would 
constitute direct evidence of discrimination. In stating that 
the AACO Director position was "reserved for the gay, white 
community," Dr. Ross in effect told Hankins that he was 
disqualified from contention because he is black. In our 
view, this would be a quintessential example of direct 
evidence. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 973 ("The most obvious 
and compelling example [of direct proof of discrimination] 
would be a remark to the effect that `I won't hire you 
because you are a woman' or `I'm firing you because you're 
not a Christian.' "). Indeed, we would be hard pressed to 
conceive of a statement that is more revealing of a 
discriminatory attitude than the one plaintiff attributes to 
Dr. Ross. 
 
As mentioned, the District Court concluded that Dr. 
Ross's comment was not significant because the statement 
was "essentially factual rather than discriminatory." 
Hankins, 1998 WL 175600 at *13. Apparently, the Court 
believed that the comment merely reflected the fact that Dr. 
Ross had already decided by the time he spoke with 
Hankins that Richard Scott -- who just happened to be 
white and gay -- was the best available person for the job. 
Id. There are two major problems with this view. The first 
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is that it represents a rather conspicuous failure on the 
part of the District Court to consider the evidence in a light 
most favorable to plaintiff, the party responding to the 
City's motion for summary judgment. Although the City 
may certainly argue at trial that Dr. Ross's comment 
revealed no discriminatory intent on his part, it is manifest 
that a reasonable jury could reject such a selective 
interpretation of the comment and instead decide that the 
statement reflected Dr. Ross's intention to exclude all non- 
white candidates from being considered for the Program 
Director position. 
 
The second flaw in the District Court's interpretation, 
closely-related to the first, is that it has little, if any, 
support in the record. The City has not suggested at any 
point in this litigation that Dr. Ross uttered the comment 
that plaintiff attributes to him, but that the statement 
demonstrates no discriminatory intent. To the contrary, 
and as the District Court recognized in its decision, the 
City's litigation position is that Dr. Ross never made the 
statement in the first place. At his deposition, Dr. Ross so 
testified. Thus, we are presented with an oath against oath 
situation: plaintiff swears that Dr. Ross told him that the 
Program Director position was set aside for a white person, 
and Dr. Ross swears that he said no such thing. It is 
axiomatic that the finder of fact must resolve such conflicts 
in testimony, not a court making a judgment as a matter of 
law. See, e.g., Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 
386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A]t the summary judgment stage, 
a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility 
determinations; these tasks are left to the fact-finder.") 
(citation omitted). 
 
The District Court apparently discounted the significance 
of Dr. Ross's alleged statement because, in part, the Court 
found it "virtually inconceivable that [Dr. Ross] would 
intentionally discriminate against plaintiff because he is 
black." Hankins, 1998 WL 175600 at *13. This was so, 
according to the District Court, because: (i) Dr. Ross had 
given plaintiff favorable treatment in the past, including 
counseling him not to resign from the City and re-hiring 
him after his resignation; (ii) Dr. Ross had previously 
appointed Anola Vance, a black person, to become AACO 
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Director and had allegedly sought the application of other 
minority candidates before selecting Richard Scott; and (iii) 
Dr. Ross is himself an African-American. Id. We concede 
that these arguments are all valid ones for the City to raise 
in attempting to convince a trier of fact that plaintiff was 
not the victim of intentional discrimination. Still, we cannot 
agree that any of these points, assessed individually or 
cumulatively, compels the conclusion that the City is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
We find especially troublesome the District Court's 
implication that because Dr. Ross is black, he would not 
have intentionally discriminated against another African- 
American. The Supreme Court has long counseled against 
such reasoning, explaining that "[b]ecause of the many 
facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume 
as a matter of law that human beings of one definable 
group will not discriminate against other members of their 
group." Castenda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977); see 
also Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 
998, 1001 (1998). The evidence here, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrates precisely why such 
a presumption is unwarranted. Plaintiff's theory of the case 
is not that he was the victim of racial animus or hatred on 
the part of the City or its officials, but instead that he was 
not permitted to compete for the Program Director position 
because of racial politics. Specifically, plaintiff contends 
that, as a result of the substantial political influence of 
AIDS advocacy organizations affiliated with the white, gay 
community, Dr. Ross was under pressure to select someone 
who was both white and gay to become the next Program 
Director. In support of his claim, plaintiff points not only to 
Dr. Ross's comment, but also to, inter alia, the testimony of 
David Fair, the former AACO Director who confirmed the 
racial and political tensions surrounding the AACO and its 
work, as well as Dr. Ross's awareness of such matters and 
Richard Scott's reputation as a leader of the gay, white 
community. Considering this evidence, we are unwilling to 
say as a matter of law that because Dr. Ross may have 
treated plaintiff well in the past (a proposition that itself is 
subject to conflicting testimony), that he had previously 
hired an African-American to become Program Director, and 
that Dr. Ross is himself black, it is therefore impossible 
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that race was a motivating factor in Dr. Ross's decision to 
hire Richard Scott instead of plaintiff. 
 
The City argues that we should ascribe no significance to 
Dr. Ross's statement because, even assuming that he had 
a discriminatory intent, he was not the relevant 
decisionmaker. According to the City, the record is 
undisputed that Mark O'Connor, the City personnel analyst 
who reviewed plaintiff's application, independently and 
without instruction from Dr. Ross or anyone else 
determined that plaintiff did not have the requisite 
experience to become Program Director. We reject the 
argument. There is overwhelming evidence in the record 
that Dr. Ross, the Health Commissioner, had the authority 
to select the Program Director. Indeed, Dr. Ross himself 
testified that he selected Richard Scott to become Program 
Director in February 1993, over three months before Mark 
O'Connor ever even reviewed plaintiff's application for the 
position. Moreover, at the time he made the selection, both 
Dr. Ross and Richard Scott considered the appointment 
permanent, notwithstanding the fact that the civil service 
process for filling the position had not even been initiated. 
Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could determine 
that Dr. Ross was the relevant decisionmaker, and that 
Mark O'Connor's review and rejection of plaintiff's 
application in June 1993, as well as the entire civil service 
process for filing the Program Director position, was merely 
an after-the-fact formality. We therefore find that plaintiff 
has presented sufficient evidence "to permit the factfinder 
to infer that [a discriminatory] attitude was more likely than 
not a motivating factor in the employer's decision" to reject 
plaintiff's application to become Program Director. Walden 
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 
The City argues that, notwithstanding this conclusion, 
the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment on 
plaintiff's race discrimination claims should still be affirmed 
because the undisputed evidence in the record is that 
plaintiff did not have the requisite qualifications to become 
Program Director. The City contends, and the District Court 
agreed, that plaintiff was ineligible to become Program 
Director because he lacked the experienced required under 
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the civil service specifications (either the original 
specifications or the specifications as amended in January 
1993), and because he lacked permanent civil service 
status when Richard Scott was officially appointed in July 
1993. We disagree with the City and hold that there are 
substantial and material factual disputes concerning 
whether plaintiff had the necessary qualifications to become 
Program Director. 
 
The District Court accepted the City's argument that 
Hankins could not have been appointed Program Director 
because he did not have the supervisory experience 
required under either set of civil service specifications. The 
parties hotly contest this issue in their briefs; plaintiff 
insists that he was qualified under either set of civil service 
specifications, and the City, relying on Mark O'Connor's 
evaluation of plaintiff's application, argues with equal vigor 
to the contrary. We believe it unnecessary to decide who 
has the best of this fight because it is premised on an 
assumption that could be rejected by the trier of fact; 
namely, that the civil service specifications did in fact 
represent the essential qualifications for the Program 
Director position. The City has admitted that, at the 
direction of Dr. Ross, the specifications were broadened in 
several respects to permit Richard Scott to qualify for the 
position. It is also not disputed that had the specifications 
not been changed, Richard Scott would not have been 
eligible. A reasonable jury could properly infer from these 
facts that had Dr. Ross been inclined to select plaintiff to 
become Program Director instead of Scott, the City would 
have amended the civil service specifications in such a 
manner to allow Hankins, not Scott, to become eligible. 
Having adjusted the civil service specifications to allow 
Richard Scott to qualify for the position, we think it 
somewhat disingenuous for the City now to argue that 
those same specifications represented an immovable, 
impenetrable bar to plaintiff's application. In any event, this 
is surely an issue for the jury to resolve. 
 
The City's final argument is that plaintiff was ineligible to 
become Program Director because, at the time Richard 
Scott was officially appointed to the position on July 19, 
1993, plaintiff was a probationary employee without 
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permanent civil service status.7 The City contends, and the 
District Court once again agreed, that the City's civil service 
law prohibits the promotion of an employee who does not 
have permanent civil service status and, therefore, plaintiff 
could not have been appointed Program Director 
notwithstanding any discriminatory intention on the part of 
Dr. Ross. Plaintiff does not dispute that, at the time of 
Richard Scott's appointment, he did not have permanent 
civil service status. He argues instead that the civil service 
regulations allow someone who was in his position-- a 
former permanent civil service employee who had previously 
resigned from the City and was then serving a probationary 
period following reinstatement -- to be eligible for a 
promotion. He refers us to Philadelphia Civil Service 
Regulation S 9.026, which is captioned "Scope Of Promotion 
Competition" and provides as follows: 
 
       Competition in any promotional examination shall be 
       open to employees with permanent Civil Service status 
       in such classes and in such departments as the 
       Director in his discretion shall determine. Employees 
       serving in a probationary period as a result of 
       reinstatement following previous service with permanent 
       status may also be admitted, provided however, that 
       such reinstated employees may not be certified for 
       appointment until the probationary period has been 
       completed. 
 
App. at 172 (emphasis added). 
 
The parties have not cited any judicial interpretations of 
this provision by the Pennsylvania state courts, but we 
agree with plaintiff that its plain meaning allows an 
employee serving a probationary period following 
reinstatement to be eligible for promotion, and that the 
regulation merely prohibits such employees from being 
officially certified until after the probationary period is 
completed. Indeed, the City conceded this at oral argument. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Plaintiff was on probation because he had resigned from the City and 
had been reinstated within one year. Under these circumstances, 
Philadelphia civil service regulations required that he serve a six month 
probationary period before resuming permanent civil service status. See 
Phil. Civil Service Regulations SS 14.02 and 15.031, App. at 189-191. 
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The City counters that, notwithstanding the permissive 
language of the regulation with respect to reinstated civil 
service employees, it has been the consistent policy and 
practice of the City's Personnel Department that individuals 
may not be promoted unless they have permanent civil 
service status within thirty days of the last date that 
applications for the position are accepted. In support of 
this, the City relies on an affidavit from the City's Personnel 
Director, which states as much. We believe, however, that 
the regulation itself, which carries the force of law, see 
Walls v. City of Philadelphia, 646 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 
Commmw. Ct.1994), and which clearly allows for a 
reinstated probationary employee to be considered for a 
promotion subject to final certification, must take 
precedence over a purported policy and practice that is 
apparently inconsistent with the regulation. Although our 
dissenting colleague apparently disagrees with this 
conclusion, she does not contest that, under the reinstated 
employee provision of Regulation 9.026, Hankins was 
eligible for a promotion. 
 
In any event, the City's contention that permanent civil 
service status was an essential, non-negotiable requirement 
for the Program Director position is belied by the record of 
this case. Since Richard Scott vacated the post in 1994, 
three individuals -- Jesse Milan, Patricia Bass, and Joseph 
Croneaur -- have served as Program Director (the latter two 
as co-Program Directors), but none had permanent civil 
service status at the time of his or her appointment. Given 
this evidence, we are mystified by the dissent's repeated 
assertion that there is a "lack of any evidence in the record 
that the City had ever discarded" the permanent civil 
service requirement. Dissent at 33; see also id. at 33 
(referring to the "consistently applied prerequisite of 
permanent civil service status"). We conclude that, at a 
minimum, there are triable issues of fact as to whether 
Hankins's lack of permanent civil service status rendered 
him unqualified to become Program Director.8 
 
(Text continues on page 25) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The dissent contends that the City was properly awarded summary 
judgment on plaintiff's failure to promote claims because: (i) Hankins 
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was purportedly unqualified as a matter of law to become Program 
Director, see dissent at 31-33, and (ii) an unqualified plaintiff cannot 
under any circumstances maintain a cause of action for disparate 
treatment, even where he has produced direct evidence that race was in 
fact a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, id. at 34-38. 
For the reasons stated in the text, we respectfully disagree with the 
first 
half of the dissent's argument (concerning Hankins's qualifications), and 
thus have no occasion to decide the merits of the second. 
 
Because the issue may arise in a future case, however, Judge Cowen 
notes his own disagreement with the dissent's interpretation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. In Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the 
Supreme Court held that when a disparate treatment plaintiff has proved 
that a forbidden criterion was a motivating factor in an employment 
action, "an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it 
had 
not taken [the forbidden criterion] into account, it would have come to 
the same decision." Id. at 242. Congress believed that this holding 
"severely undercut" the effectiveness of Title VII. H.R. Rep. 102-40(I) at 
45, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583. The House Report explained: 
 
       The Court's holding in Price Waterhouse severely undermines 
       protections against intentional employment discrimination by 
       allowing such discrimination to escape sanction completely under 
       Title VII. Under this holding, even if a court finds that a Title 
VII 
       defendant has clearly engaged in intentional discrimination, that 
       court is powerless to end that abuse if the particular plaintiff 
who 
       brought the case would have suffered the disputed employment 
       action for some alternative, legitimate reason. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40-(II) at 18, reprinted in  1991 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 711. 
 
Accordingly, under the 1991 Act, "an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(m). In a departure from Price Waterhouse, 
however, the 1991 Act also provides that when an employer proves that 
it would have taken the same action in the absence of discrimination, a 
plaintiff can still recover attorney's fees, costs, declaratory relief, 
and 
limited injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C. S 20005(g)(2)(B)(i), although he will 
not 
be entitled to damages, promotion, or reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. 
S 20005(g)(2)(B)(ii). 
 
In Judge Cowen's view, these provisions make it clear that a plaintiff 
who produces direct evidence that discriminatory animus was a 
motivating factor in an adverse employment decision is entitled to 
survive summary judgment even when an employer can establish as a 
matter of law that the plaintiff would have been subject to the same 
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employment decision in the absence of discrimination. As the Seventh 
Circuit has explained: 
 
       The upshot of these provisions is that once the plaintiff has 
       presented evidence reasonably suggesting that her race, sex, 
       religion, or national origin played a motivating role in her 
discharge, 
       summary judgment will rarely (if ever) be appropriate; for even if 
the 
       employer can eliminate all doubt at that point as to whether it 
       would have taken the same action without considering the 
       proscribed criterion, the plaintiff still might obtain limited 
relief. 
 
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
Applying this rule to the instant case, Judge Cowen believes that, even 
if the City could demonstrate that Hankins would not have been 
appointed Program Director because of his lacking credentials, based on 
the direct evidence of Dr. Ross's discriminatory intent, a factual dispute 
would still remain as to whether Hankins's race was, in actuality, a 
motivating factor in the City's decision not to appoint him. If a jury 
decided that it was, in Judge Cowen's view, Hankins would still be 
entitled to "declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . and attorney's 
fees and 
costs directly attributable . . . to the pursuit of [the] claim," although 
he 
would not be entitled to damages, promotion, or payment. 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 
Judge Cowen observes that the dissent avoids this result by reading a 
"qualifications exception" into S 2000e-2(m) and S 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
According to the dissent, even though the 1991 Act provides without 
exception that an illegal employment practice is established upon proof 
that "discrimination was a motivating factor in an adverse employment 
action, " S 2000e-2(m), and that an employer may only limit the remedies 
available to a plaintiff by showing that it would have taken the same 
adverse employment action in the absence of a discriminatory motive, 
Congress actually intended to deny any cause of action altogether to a 
plaintiff who is not qualified for a given position. This is true, 
according 
to the dissent, even when that plaintiff has direct proof that an adverse 
employment decision was in fact motivated by invidious discrimination 
and not by the lack of qualifications. Thus, in the dissent's view, a 
hypothetical minority job applicant who is told point-blank at an 
interview that he is being denied the position because of his race is 
entitled to no relief whatsoever, not even a declaratory order from a 
court 
prohibiting that employer from considering race in future employment 
decisions, so long as the employer is able to establish, well after the 
fact, 
that the applicant would not have received the position in any event 
because he lacked a particular job qualification. On the other hand, 
according to the dissent, the same minority applicant with direct 
evidence of discrimination would presumably be entitled to the limited 
relief provided for in S 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) if the employer demonstrated 
that 
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the District Court 
erred in awarding summary judgment to the City on 
plaintiff's race discrimination claims.9  
 
B. Retaliation Claim 
 
Plaintiff next argues that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment to the City on his retaliation 
claim. Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer to 
discriminate against an employee because "he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
chapter." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation under a pretext theory, a plaintiff must 
show that (1) he was engaged in protected activity; (2) he 
was subject to an adverse employment action subsequent 
to or contemporaneously with such activity; and (3) there is 
a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse 
action. See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 
(3d Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff succeeds, the production 
burden shifts to a defendant to advance a legitimate, non- 
retaliatory reason for its employment decision. Id. at 920 
n.2. "The defendant's burden at this stage is relatively light: 
it is satisfied if the defendant articulated any legitimate 
reason" for the adverse decision. Id. If the defendant 
satisfies its burden of production, the presumption of 
discrimination drops from the case; to prevail, the plaintiff 
must be able to demonstrate that defendant's proffered 
reason is false and that discrimination was the real reason. 
Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 
512 (1993)). 
 
Plaintiff contends that a reasonable jury could conclude 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the applicant would not have received the job for some legitimate reason 
unrelated to his qualifications. Judge Cowen believes that such a view is 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 1991 Act and the intent of 
Congress as demonstrated in the above quoted legislative history. 
 
9. Because we conclude that, under a modified Price Waterhouse 
analysis, plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial, we need not address his 
alternative argument that he has made a sufficient showing to survive 
summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas pretext formula. Of 
course, this does not preclude plaintiff from pursuing a pretext theory at 
trial. See Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 781 n.17; see also supra note 6. 
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that the City has decided that it will not promote any Civil 
Service employee -- including himself -- to become 
Program Director while this litigation is pending. He points 
to the fact that since Richard Scott was removed as 
Program Director, Jesse Milan, Patricia Bass, and Joseph 
Croneaur were all appointed to the position outside of the 
civil service process, despite plaintiff's expressed interest in 
the position. 
 
We will assume arguendo that this minimal showing 
satisfies the requirements of a prima facie case of 
retaliation. But in response, Estelle Richman, the Health 
Commissioner who appointed Milan, Bass and Croneaur, 
has testified that she sought to appoint individuals to the 
Program Director position outside of the civil service 
process not to retaliate against plaintiff, but because, before 
committing to a permanent civil service appointment, she 
wanted to understand why the AACO was, in her view, a 
dysfunctional agency. This explanation, which is legitimate 
and non-retaliatory, satisfied the City's burden of 
production. Plaintiff, in turn, has not pointed to any 
evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that 
Richman's reason is untrue or is otherwise a pretext for 
discrimination.10 He is therefore not entitled to proceed on 
this cause of action. We will affirm the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment to the City on plaintiff's 
retaliation claim. 
 
V. Conspiracy Claims 
 
Hankins next argues that he is entitled to a jury trial on 
his claim that the Union and the City conspired to deprive 
him of the Program Director position because of his race, in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) and state conspiracy law.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Plaintiff contends that the City's Personnel Director, Linda Seyda, 
admitted at her deposition that the City has a policy of not filling 
positions that are the subject of pending litigation. Our review of her 
testimony, however, indicates that she did not so testify. 
 
11. 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3) prohibits a conspiracy formed "for the purpose of 
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons 
of 
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws...." 
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To maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1985(3), a plaintiff 
must establish: "(1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial 
or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, 
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons ... [of] 
the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance 
of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or 
the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the 
United States." Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
The conspiracy that plaintiff alleges between the City and 
the Union is based on an alleged agreement between 
Richard Scott, an employee of the Union, and Dr. Ross, the 
City's Health Commissioner, to place Scott in the Program 
Director position because of Scott's race. The record is 
undisputed, however, that no Union official was aware that 
Scott was planning to accept the position until after he had 
already done so. In the absence of such knowledge on the 
part of a Union official, a reasonable jury could not find 
that Scott was acting as an agent of the Union in accepting 
the Program Director position and resigning from the 
Union. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to prove the existence 
of a conspiracy between the Union and the City, an 
essential element of his S 1985(3) claim. 
 
Hankins's S 1985(3) claim also fails because there is no 
evidence that anyone affiliated with the Union, including 
Scott, sought to deny him the Program Director position 
because of his race. Even if plaintiff could demonstrate that 
Scott was acting on behalf of the Union in accepting the 
Program Director position, Hankins has failed to show that 
Scott did so with any intention of discriminating against 
him. While a jury might find that Dr. Ross harbored an 
improper motive in appointing Scott to the position, there is 
no evidence that Scott shared that intention. Accordingly, 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's 
S 1985(3) conspiracy claims.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The parties have analyzed plaintiff's state law civil conspiracy claim 
and his S 1985(3) claim under the same standards. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the state law 
civil conspiracy claim as well. 
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VI. Remaining Claims 
 
Plaintiff also presses his claim against the Union for 
intentional interference with prospective contractual 
relations. He maintains that had the Union not remained 
silent while the City amended the civil service specifications 
for the Program Director position, he would have been 
appointed to the job. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, to establish intentional 
interference with prospective contractual relations, a 
plaintiff must prove: "(1) the existence of a contractual, or 
prospective contractual relation between itself and a third 
party; (2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, 
specifically intended to harm the existing relation, or to 
prevent the prospective relation from occurring; (3) The 
absence of a privilege or justification on the part of the 
defendant; (4) the occasioning of actual legal damage as a 
result of the defendants' conduct; and (5) . . . a reasonable 
likelihood that the relationship would have occurred but for 
the interference of the defendant." Brokerage Concepts, Inc. 
v. U.S. Healthcare, 140 F.3d 494, 530 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 
Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988)). 
 
The Union argues, and the District Court found, that 
plaintiff failed to establish that there is reasonable 
likelihood that he would have been appointed Program 
Director but for the purported interference of the Union. We 
agree. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff, a reasonable jury could not find that had the 
Union objected to the amendments of the civil service 
specifications, there is a reasonable probability that 
Hankins would have been selected Program Director. As 
plaintiff concedes, Program Director was not one of the 
positions covered by the collective bargaining agreement 
between the City and the Union. Therefore, the Union 
would not have had standing to object to an amendment of 
the Program Director civil service specifications. Plaintiff 
nonetheless insists that the Union had the authority to 
object to any change in the civil service specifications that 
affected its members; he cites Cathy Scott's preliminary 
investigation into Richard Scott's appointment as evidence 
of this fact. Even if plaintiff is correct, however, a fact finder 
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would be engaging in speculation to assume that the City 
would not have amended the specifications if the Union had 
lodged an objection related to a non-bargaining unit 
position. 
 
Furthermore, even if the Union could have prevented the 
City from amending the specifications, it does not then 
follow that there is a reasonable likelihood that plaintiff 
would have been appointed Program Director. Although 
Richard Scott may not have been selected if the 
specifications were left unaltered, there is no way of 
knowing who would have been appointed in his place. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's intentional interference with 
prospective business relations claim against the Union 
must fail. 
 
Plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claim against the 
Union is also deficient.13 He alleges that Patricia Walden, on 
behalf of the Union, committed fraud by assuring him that 
the Union would investigate Richard Scott's appointment as 
Program Director and then informing him approximately 
two months later that it was too late for the Union to take 
any action. Plaintiff has made no showing, however, that 
Walden acted with an intent to defraud or that any 
statement that she made proximately caused an injury that 
he suffered. We will therefore affirm the District Court on 
this count as well. 
 
VII. Motions for Sanctions 
 
Finally, plaintiff has appealed the District Court's denial 
of his motion for sanctions against the City. With respect to 
the three incidents of alleged misconduct cited by plaintiff, 
the District Court found that the City's counsel did not 
improperly attempt to influence Dr. Ross during his 
deposition, that David Fair was not threatened with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. To sustain his fraud claim, plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that (i) the defendant fraudulently made a 
misrepresentation with an intent to induce plaintiff to act thereon; (ii) 
that plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresentation; and (iii) that 
he 
sustained actual damages as a proximate result. See Tunis Bros. Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 731 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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retaliation by the City's counsel, and that the City's counsel 
did not act improperly in investigating plaintiff's 
background in South Carolina. Having thoroughly reviewed 
the record related to each of these incidents, we cannot 
conclude that the District Court's factual findings are 
clearly erroneous or that its refusal to impose sanctions 
was otherwise an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court's order denying plaintiff's motion 
for sanctions. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment to the City on plaintiff's 
race discrimination claims, but will affirm the judgment in 
favor of the City on plaintiff's retaliation, S 1985(3), and 
state law conspiracy claims. We will also affirm in all 
respects the District Court's grant of summary judgment to 
the Union, as well as the District Court's denial of plaintiff's 
motion for sanctions against the City. 
 
Each party to bear its own costs. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I agree with the majority that, viewing the record in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff as we are required to for 
purposes of summary judgment, we must regard the 
statement allegedly made by Dr. Ross as direct evidence of 
discriminatory animus. I part from the majority, however, 
because I believe the majority has erred in disregarding the 
significance of Hankins' failure to meet one of the objective 
minimum qualifications for the job he sought. 
 
The key to the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment was its determination that Hankins had not 
produced evidence to show that he was qualified for the 
position of Director of the AIDS Activities Coordination 
Office ("AAOC") (referred to by the District Court as 
"Program Director"). The majority holds that"there are 
substantial and material factual disputes concerning 
whether plaintiff had the necessary qualifications to become 
Program Director," Maj. Op. at 20, a conclusion with which 
I disagree. 
 
I would uphold the District Court's conclusion that 
Hankins "plainly lacked the qualifications for the position," 
Hankins v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 95-1449, 
slip op. at 28 (E.D. Pa. 1998), because it was based on 
uncontroverted evidence in the record (1) that one of "the 
primary requirement[s] of both [the] Promotional 
Opportunity Announcements [was] that the applicant have 
permanent Civil Service status within thirty days of the 
closing date of the announcement," id. at 24-25, and (2) 
that Hankins "did not and within thirty days could not have 
permanent Civil Service status," id. at 28. The applicable 
Civil Service regulation, Regulation 9.026, made promotion 
open "to employees with permanent Civil Service status." 
Hankins conceded that he lacked such status at the 
relevant time. For me, that is dispositive. 
 
Undaunted by these plain facts, Hankins made several 
arguments why he should nevertheless have been 
appointed Program Director. First, Hankins argued that he 
could have taken the examination for Program Director 
while on probationary status and the City could have either 
temporarily appointed him or waited to appoint him until 
 
                                31 
  
after he achieved permanent status. Second, Hankins 
argued that, as a reinstated employee, he should have been 
deemed eligible to take the examination for Program 
Director when the position was posted and then "certified" 
when he achieved permanent Civil Service status on 
September 1, 1993. Finally, Hankins argued that the City 
routinely manipulated the Civil Service regulations and 
should not be permitted to shield behind them. 
 
The City was not required to excuse Hankins from the 
qualifications for Program Director unless it would 
ordinarily have excused other candidates from these 
qualifications under similar circumstances. As the District 
Court concluded, Hankins failed to present any competent 
evidence to suggest that the City would have excused other 
candidates from the permanent Civil Service status 
requirement. Hankins contends that the City frequently 
holds positions open or crafts temporary appointments to 
allow a candidate to achieve permanent Civil Service status, 
but he did not submit any evidence to support this 
contention. 
 
Moreover, the Personnel Director of the City testified that 
it is consistent City policy and practice not to appoint 
persons if they do not have permanent Civil Service status 
and that individuals may not compete unless they meet the 
qualifications within 30 days of the closing date for 
applications, which Hankins was unable to do because the 
closing date for the position was June 30, 1993, and 
Hankins' probationary period ended August 31, 1993. The 
District Court also found that Hankins "present[ed] . . . no 
competent evidence to substantiate his . . . accusation that 
the City routinely manipulates Civil Service Regulations to 
achieve illicit goals." Id. at 26. This is enough to support 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment, without 
considering the City's contention that Hankins also lacked 
the necessary experience. 
 
The majority reasons that because the Civil Service 
specifications "were broadened in several respects to permit 
Richard Scott to qualify for the position," a jury could infer 
that had the City wanted to select Hankins, it "would have 
amended the civil service specifications in such a manner 
to allow Hankins, not Scott, to become eligible." Maj. Op. at 
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20. The weak spot in the majority's "amend at will" 
approach is the lack of any evidence in the record that the 
City had ever discarded the requirement that the applicant 
have permanent Civil Service status,14  a requirement that 
Hankins did not satisfy at the time in question. 
 
Hankins does not suggest that Scott lacked permanent 
Civil Service status, and the majority acknowledges that 
Scott had that status. Maj. Op. at 8. The changes in job 
qualifications that were made to enable Scott to qualify 
permitted a candidate to substitute a bachelor's degree and 
three years of experience administering a "national 
HIV/AIDS program" for the requirement of a master's 
degree and three years of second-level supervisory 
experience. The City's willingness to permit candidates to 
substitute what appears to be an equivalent experience to 
meet this requirement does not support the majority's 
conclusion that the City was flexible at will about the 
requirement of permanent Civil Service status. 
 
Moreover, the changes in job description requirements 
were not made at the will of the personnel department. 
Instead the substitutions had to be and were approved by 
the Civil Service Commission before they were made and 
before Scott resumed his employment with the City. 
Hankins offered no evidence to suggest that the Civil 
Service Commission would revise or delete the consistently 
applied prerequisite of permanent Civil Service status. In 
contrast, the City offered evidence that it had never done 
so. I would therefore uphold the District Court's decision to 
grant summary judgment on the issue of Hankins' 
qualifications. 
 
One of the prerequisites of a plaintiff's Title VII case 
based on disparate treatment is a showing that plaintiff 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. There is no reason for the majority to be mystified by this assertion. 
Because of the pendency of this lawsuit, the City was understandably 
reluctant to find a permanent replacement. Jesse Milan was never 
employed by the City, having been on loan from Temple University. The 
other two individuals referred to by the majority, Patricia Bass and 
Joseph Cronauer, were hired on a contract basis. None of these 
individuals were hired at time Hankins had applied or Scott had been 
given the position. 
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was qualified for the position at issue, irrespective of which 
of the two different types of disparate treatment cases 
plaintiff falls within: the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine or 
pretext cases on the one hand or the Price Waterhouse or 
"mixed-motives" cases on the other. "[W]hether a plaintiff 
has presented a pretext or a mixed-motives case depends 
on the quality of the evidence that the plaintiff adduces in 
support of the claim of illegal discrimination." Walden v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). For 
a case to be treated as a mixed-motives case, "the evidence 
must be such that it demonstrates that the `decisionmakers 
placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate 
criterion in reaching their decision.' " Id. 
 
Qualification for the position at issue is unquestionably 
one of the elements of a prima facie case for employment 
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of 
cases. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). "The burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not 
onerous. The plaintiff must prove . . . that she applied for 
an available position for which she was qualified, but was 
rejected under circumstances which give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination." Id. at 253 (emphasis 
added). 
 
I believe that a plaintiff is required to show at least as 
much to shift the burden of proof to the defendant under 
the Price Waterhouse line of cases. We have described the 
showing that a Price Waterhouse plaintiff must make as "a 
high hurdle," Walden, 126 F.3d at 513, and remarked that 
such a plaintiff "must produce . . . more direct evidence 
than is required for the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima 
facie case," Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 
1089, 1096 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995). Although this language, 
reasonably construed, requires the plaintiff in a Price 
Waterhouse case to satisfy the additional requirement of 
submitting direct evidence of discriminatory animus, it does 
not mean that the plaintiff in such a case is excused from 
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine requirement that she prove 
that she was a qualified candidate. As noted above, the 
Supreme Court has commented that this burden is"not 
onerous." 
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I note that there is nothing in the 1991 amendments to 
Title VII, embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that 
suggests that a Price Waterhouse plaintiff need not be an 
objectively qualified candidate to survive summary 
judgment. 
 
The 1991 Act arose from efforts to overturn the result of 
several Supreme Court decisions that members of Congress 
believed were inconsistent with Title VII's goal of eradicating 
discrimination. One of the decisions explicitly targeted was 
Price Waterhouse.15 In that case, a woman whose candidacy 
for partnership in an accounting firm had been placed on 
hold sued under Title VII and produced evidence showing 
that reviews from male partners containing sex 
stereotypical judgments had played a role in that decision; 
her employer produced evidence showing that she would 
have been denied that partnership even in the absence of 
discrimination. 
 
The Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, held that 
"when a plaintiff . . . proves that her gender played a 
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant 
may avoid a finding of liability . . . by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the 
same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender 
into account." 490 U.S. at 258. The Supreme Court's 
decision thus concerned the elements of a defendant's 
affirmative defense of mixed motives rather than the 
elements that a plaintiff must prove as part of her initial 
showing before the burden is shifted to the defendant, the 
issue facing this court here. Its discussion assumed that 
the plaintiff had already both proven the equivalent of a 
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, 
presumably including objective qualification, and submitted 
direct evidence of discrimination. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Another decision targeted, Wards Cove v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989), was viewed as retreating from the disparate impact decision in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albermarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), by placing the burden on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate which criteria within a multi-factor employment practice 
have a disparate impact. Section 105 of the 1991 Act sought to restore 
the business necessity defense to its pre-Wards Cove status by 
amending 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2. 
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The House Report which constitutes the legislative 
history of the 1991 Act, H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I) (1991), 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, confirms that 
Congress, too, was concerned with the defendant's 
affirmative defense, not the plaintiff's initial burden of 
proof. The Report opined that the inevitable result of the 
Price Waterhouse decision would be to permit employment 
discrimination prohibited under Title VII to escape 
sanction. Id. at 584. In response, Congress enacted the first 
of the 1991 amendments relevant here which added to the 
earlier statutory provision making it an unlawful 
employment practice to reach decisions based on race or 
one of the other prohibited considerations the language 
"even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-2(m). 
 
The House Report also expressed disapproval of the lack 
of a remedy in a mixed motive case. It noted that, because 
of the Price Waterhouse decision, an employer whose 
employment decision was motivated in part but not 
exclusively by an illegitimate consideration could not even 
be enjoined from utilizing the same illegitimate 
consideration in future decisions. See id. at 585 (citing as 
illustrative EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920 
(11th Cir. 1990)). This led to the second amendment, which 
amended the remedy provision of the statute to provide that 
if an impermissible consideration was a motivating factor in 
the employment decision, the plaintiff could still be entitled 
to "declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . and attorney's fees 
and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable . . . only 
to the pursuit of a [Title VII] claim," but not damages. 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-5(g). 
 
In its discussion of the necessity of these amendments, 
the House Report assumes that plaintiff has already met 
her burden of proof, which I believe includes a showing that 
she possessed the objective minimum qualifications for 
employment in the position she sought. Nothing in the 
House Report suggests that the two amendments directed 
to the Price Waterhouse decision were meant to relieve 
plaintiff of the burden of showing that she possessed those 
objective qualifications, a burden established by the 
Supreme Court prior to Price Waterhouse. To the contrary, 
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Congress defined its intent in adopting the 1991 legislation 
as "to restore Title VII's comprehensive ban on all 
impermissible considerations of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin in employment." Id. at 585-86 (first 
emphasis added). 
 
It follows that a plaintiff who patently failed to show that 
s/he has the minimum qualifications for the position could 
not proceed to trial on a Title VII claim either before or after 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. My colleague Judge Cowen 
spins an unrealistic hypothetical web (i.e. a "minority job 
applicant who is told point blank at an interview that he is 
being denied the position because of his race") in an 
attempt to show that an applicant who patently was lacking 
the essential objective qualifications needed for the position 
at issue can nonetheless proceed to trial because of that 
Act. I do not agree. 
 
The case Judge Cowen cites, Venters v. City of Delphi, 
123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997), makes no reference to the 
plaintiff's objective qualifications or lack thereof. Instead, in 
Venters the defendant countered plaintiff's claim that she 
was terminated on account of her religion in violation of 
Title VII by attempting to show that it was plaintiff's 
performance, which the defendant claimed was deficient, 
that led to her termination. Id. at 964. Venters illustrates 
the paradigmatic mixed-motive case to which the 
amendments apply -- where each party offers a subjective 
reason for the employment decision -- one legitimate and 
one discriminatory. In such cases, the parties typically do 
not contest whether plaintiff meets the objective minimum 
requirements for employment in the position. 
 
The weakness of Judge Cowen's position is further 
illustrated by a not unrealistic hypothetical. Assume that 
applicable state law requires that all law enforcement 
officers be at least 21 years of age. May an 18-year old 
female applicant, whose application for employment with a 
township police department was denied, proceed to trial on 
the strength of evidence that the Township Police Chief has 
openly expressed his view that women should not be hired 
as police officers because they do not have the strength 
necessary to do the work required by the police 
department? I would suggest that the only rational answer 
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is no. The hypothetical situation is not dissimilar to that 
here -- a remark has been made that can be deemed 
evidence of discriminatory motive and the plaintiff fails to 
satisfy an objective qualification for the position. I do not 
believe that Congress anticipated that a plaintiff who 
patently failed to show that s/he has the minimum 
qualifications for the position could proceed to trial because 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
 
Because Hankins failed to satisfy an objective 
qualification for the Program Director position, I would 
affirm. 
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